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ABSTRACT 
 
The global and long-term nature of climate change conflicts with the reality of self-interested 
and short-term oriented nations. International negotiations have failed to reach an 
agreement that achieves effective mitigation, as this dual conflict has not been resolved. This 
paper proposes an alternative approach to international cooperation, one designed with the 
conflicting self-interests and short-termism in mind. Key elements of the proposed framework 
are: establishing a new international treaty and fund; determining a benchmark emission 
path for each country as well as a carbon price; paying countries annually through the fund 
for reducing emissions below their benchmark levels as opposed to penalizing them for 
higher emissions; financing the fund’s annual payments by raising capital from private 
investors; and repaying the private capital in the long-term using contributions from 
participating countries. The benefits of this approach include that reaching an international 
agreement becomes more realistic, self-interest and short-termism are transformed from 
obstacles into drivers of climate change mitigation and additional financing is created to 
support the necessary investments. Cutting emissions, currently a burden to be shared 
among countries in a zero sum game, turns into an opportunity.  
 
Keywords: Carbon payment, UN climate negotiations, Climate change, Global warming, 
Carbon price, Private investor financing 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), an international treaty with 
the objective of limiting greenhouse gas emission to avoid dangerous climate change, was signed in 
1992 and all members of the United Nations have ratified it. Notwithstanding the UNFCCC and the 
numerous attempts to achieve its objective during the past 24 years, we still do not have an 
international agreement that ensures effective climate change mitigation. The Paris Agreement, 
representing the latest approach to global cooperation, builds on voluntary contributions by countries 
and a future review process. However, the sum of individual contributions falls considerably short of 
the overall contribution needed to achieve the agreement’s objective, the individual contributions are 
not binding and cannot be enforced, and there is no mechanism to ensure that future reviews and 
revisions of contributions will result in more meaningful emission cuts. Voluntary action has in no area 
succeeded to solve the problem of the undersupply of a public good especially in case of a global 
public good (Stiglitz 2015). Further, the Paris Agreement poses the risk that the appearance of success 
delays further efforts of the international community to find a more effective solution at a time when 
further delays can be ill afforded.  
 
This failure of the international community is all the more striking if we consider that there is broad 
agreement on the scientific, economic and moral arguments for climate change mitigation. While many 
details and systematic interactions of the climate need to be better understood, there is general 
consensus within the scientific community that climate change is happening largely due to human 
actions and that it poses great environmental, social, political and economic risks (IPCC 2014). The 
economic benefits of earlier rather than later mitigation are also compelling. Delays rapidly increase 																																																								
a Founder, Climate Opportunity Initiative (www.climateopportunityinitiative.org) . 
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the risks and future costs partly due to the accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere and partly due 
to the additional build-out of carbon intensive infrastructure and social structures in the meantime. 
The precautionary principle is another reason to limit climate change considering the uncertainties we 
face with regard to the exact path of climate change and its impact on people and ecosystems. Finally, 
the moral case for limiting climate change is also overwhelming. Future generations will inherit a 
profoundly different environment as a result of our actions, and we know that this will threaten the 
lives and livelihood of a large number of people, especially those living in poverty and in less developed 
countries. There are no moral justifications for ignoring this.  
 
The premise of this paper is that an effective international agreement has not been reached, as two 
fundamental conflicts between the nature of climate change and our political and social reality have 
not been resolved. First, the atmosphere is a shared, global resource and its use is a perfect example 
of the issues described by the theory of the tragedy of the commons. The burden of climate change 
mitigation is born by those who act while the benefits are shared by everyone globally. In a world of 
self-interested nations this creates the problem of free riders and conflicting interests. Second, 
mitigation involves upfront costs, but the benefits materialize over a very long period – the time 
horizon for realizing most of the benefits would be around 50-100 years and beyond. This contrasts 
with the dominance of short-termism in politics, business and even individual choices, meaning that 
other issues take priority and climate change mitigation is pushed into the future. The focus of 
international negotiations has been to allocate the burden of mitigation among countries through a 
global cap-and-trade scheme and more recently through voluntary contributions. These approaches 
do not resolve these fundamental conflicts. Rather than their short-term self-interest, it appeals to the 
ambition, common responsibilities and long-term benefits of nations to achieve mitigation. This 
emphasis on costly commitments and their allocation among nations renders international 
cooperation and an effective agreement very difficult to achieve.  
 
The aim of this paper is to outline and make the case for a climate agreement designed for the reality 
of self-interested and shortsighted countries and decision-makers. The framework proposed not only 
removes these obstacles, but also turns them into drivers of fast and effective climate change 
mitigation. Further, it creates additional financing provided by private sector investors to support 
investments in the abatement of carbon emissions. 
 
Humanity has the resources, technology and ingenuity to limit climate change and the risks it poses. 
Successful international cooperation is, however, critical to live up to this potential.   
 
2. A climate agreement designed with short-term self-interest in mind 
 
The outline of the proposed climate agreement is summarized in the following points.  
1. A new international treaty is agreed which establishes the Climate Opportunity Fund (also referred 
to as the Fund in the rest of the paper). 
2. Any country can sign up to become a member of the treaty and the Fund. Participation is voluntary, 
but once a country is a member, the treaty is binding.  
3. In addition to being voluntary, the treaty does not require participating countries to make a binding 
commitment to any emission level. As a result, countries face no potential penalties or other 
consequences irrespective of their emissions.  
4. For each country the treaty determines a net greenhouse gas emission profile over time, the 
country’s benchmark emission path (also referred to as the benchmark in the rest of the paper).  
5. The treaty determines a carbon price per unit of net emission.  
6. Countries can directly benefit from reducing their emissions below their respective benchmark 
through an annual payment from the Climate Opportunity Fund. The Fund’s payment to each 
country equals the product of the carbon price and the number of units by which the country’s 
actual net emissions are below its benchmark for the year in question (its emission saving). 
7. The Fund finances the annual payments to participating countries by raising funds from private 
investors through the issuance of long-term bonds. The bonds offer a financial return to investors 
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in addition to representing a green investment.  
8. The bonds are the liability of the Fund, which is backed by the credit of participating countries 
similar to multi-lateral development agencies.  The liabilities are repaid through contributions by 
participants in the future. The allocation of the Fund’s long-term liabilities among countries is based 
on their share of carbon emissions under the respective benchmarks i.e. a country with ten times 
the benchmark emissions would be liable for ten times the liabilities of the Fund.  
 
The following charts show the financial flows of the proposed framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A simplified two-country example together with a more detailed discussion of the financing of the 
Fund’s operations in section 5 illustrates how the Fund would work.  
 
3. Agreeing benchmark emission levels for individual countries 
 
The difficulty of agreeing an allocation of commitments among countries is one of the main reasons 
why an effective international agreement has not been reached yet. Determining the benchmark 
emission path for each country will likely remain a contentious issue under the proposed plan too, as 
there is no objectively fair way of setting them. However, under the framework outlined, reaching an 
agreement on individual benchmark emission levels is more realistic than under the current approach 
for the following reasons. 
 
Member 
country 
Climate Opportunity Fund 
Member 
country 
Member 
country 
Member 
country 
Investor Investor Investor Investor 
Figure 1. Financing of the Fund’s annual payments 
Cash 
Long-term bond issuance 
Payment subject 
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ﬁnancing needs 
Member 
country 
Climate Opportunity Fund 
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Figure 2. Financing of the Fund’s long-term liabilities 
Cash 
Long-term bond claim 
Contributions 
based on emission 
benchmark 
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First, the benchmarks are not legally binding and there are no potential penalties or direct transfers 
among countries. This should make the agreement more palatable from a political perspective and 
more easily implementable from a legal perspective for some countries.  
 
Second, the sum of the individual benchmarks can exceed the desired global path without risking the 
success of the scheme.  The payment mechanism creates incentives for every country to emit less than 
its benchmark, which means that – subject to the predetermined carbon price and the benchmark 
emission levels – total emissions are highly likely to be lower than the sum of the benchmarks. An 
agreement with higher emission benchmarks would be more acceptable for countries for a variety of 
reasons, not least because a higher benchmark creates the potential for receiving higher short-term 
payments from the Fund. 
 
Third, the allocation of the Fund’s long-term liabilities being linked to countries’ overall emission 
benchmark implies that there is an offsetting long-term cost to negotiating a higher benchmark for a 
country, which reduces its incentive to maximize its benchmark emission path. Clearly, the smaller a 
country’s share of overall emissions is, the lower the increase in its long-term liabilities relative to its 
potential gain of increased payments received. Hence, the smaller the country in terms of emissions, 
the less relevant this trade-off becomes. Given that China, the United States and the European Union 
are the largest contributors to global greenhouse gas emissions with respective shares of 23.1%, 11.8% 
and 8.7% in 2012 (EDGAR), this trade-off between higher benchmarks and higher future liabilities is 
most meaningful for these countries. Agreement on emission benchmarks among the three largest 
contributors – with a combined share of close to half of the global total – would be a great step forward 
towards a global agreement.  
 
Fourth, as countries are not obliged to join the agreement and the emission benchmarks are not 
legally binding, countries could join in stages and an agreement to the benchmarks by all countries 
would not need to be secured at the same time. This reduces the risk of a small number of countries 
sabotaging or delaying an agreement or attempting to capitalize on such a threat to improve their 
negotiating position. Ideally, the agreement would set out the benchmark emission levels even for 
countries not joining and would create a credible mechanism to ensure that countries joining later will 
be subject to the same terms. This would reduce the risk of countries holding out in the hope of 
securing higher benchmarks or more favorable terms and would motivate them to join sooner rather 
than later in order to benefit from the Fund’s payments as early as possible.  
 
Fifth, and probably most importantly, through the possibility of receiving payments from the Fund, the 
framework creates strong incentives for countries to find an agreement and to join. In a world 
dominated by short-term thinking by decision-makers including governments, businesses as well as 
individuals, the short-term benefit of joining and making a profit on emission abatement will be 
attractive and an important motivation. This only requires that countries will be able to reduce 
emissions at a cost below the agreement’s carbon price, and we do not have to rely on them taking 
into account co-benefits, the costs of avoided adaptation or pursuing altruistic actions driven by moral 
considerations. Depending on the policies they use in pursuing emission cuts, governments could of 
course generate additional revenues above those received from the Fund and this will likely form part 
of their calculations too. A carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system that charges for emission rights would 
be examples of such policies.  
 
There is a strong case to use the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) countries 
submitted before the Paris Agreement as a starting point for determining the emission benchmarks. As 
countries themselves determined the INDCs, the argument that the emission levels they imply are 
unacceptable and should be increased is a difficult one to make. Of course, there can still be 
disagreements about the relative ambitiousness of the INDCs and about the different approaches used 
to arrive at them. These differences are relevant due to their impact on the potential emission savings 
of individual countries and their prospects for payments from the Fund. Another complication of using 
INDCs as a starting point is that INDCs do not prescribe emission levels for every year and even the 
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target year varies across INDCs. Most of them set a target for 2030, some set a target for 2025 and 
some set a target for both 2025 and 2030. On the other hand, delaying an agreement in the hope of 
finding a different and fairer approach to determine the individual benchmarks might not be worth the 
costs of further delays to climate change mitigation. Establishing the benchmarks based on INDCs 
would, of course, mean that the sum of emission benchmarks exceeds the desired emission level. 
However, as discussed above, under such a framework this does not necessarily lead to a failure of the 
agreement, as every country will be incentivized to reduce emissions below its benchmark.  
 
4. Determining the carbon price  
 
Setting the carbon price at the right level, on which payments to participants are based, will be 
essential to make the plan a success. It should provide a strong incentive for countries to join the 
agreement and subsequently to reduce emissions. Accordingly, it should be set with reference to the 
estimated cost of net carbon abatement across countries and the expected impact of a carbon price on 
emissions. The different circumstances of countries will likely mean that countries will end up with 
different abatement potential compared to their benchmark, as the price signal favors the more cost 
efficient emission reductions and facilitates economic efficiency.  
 
Clearly, the proposed scheme has the flexibility to use a dynamic carbon price such as a pre-
determined price path or a price indexed to some variables. A dynamic approach or the periodic 
review of the carbon price might be necessary to adjust it in light of the abatement achieved or other 
lessons learnt during implementation. This flexibility will have to be balanced against the importance of 
predictability, which is an important feature of a successful carbon price given it serves as a price signal 
for long-lived investments. There has been much research into the cost of emission cuts and the 
impact of a carbon price (for example Gollier (2015)), and it is not the aim of this paper to explore the 
right carbon price level in detail.  
 
It is worth noting that – in contrast to the current plans and proposals promoting a global carbon price 
(Cramton et al. 2015a) – participants will have a strong incentive to set the price at a sufficiently high 
level. As the Fund’s payments effectively represent a financial transfer from future generations to the 
current one in order to support climate change mitigation, a higher carbon price means higher 
transfers to the present. As long as the premise of self-interested and short-term focused decision-
makers holds, higher transfers received will be a motivation to use a higher carbon price. Accordingly, 
achieving a high enough carbon price does not rely on values or arguments balancing current costs 
and future benefits. In light of the slow progress over the past two and a half decades, this is an 
important advantage.  
 
The carbon price will, of course, also be an important factor for the financing need of the Fund. This 
aspect of the proposal is discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
5. Financing the operations of the Climate Opportunity Fund 
 
Attracting sufficient, low-cost private capital to finance the annual payments to participants will be 
critical for the success of the agreement. In turn, ensuring the Fund has strong credit based on the 
financial backing of participating countries will be important. This requires a robust political and legal 
framework as well as the financial strength of participants. The details of optimizing the attractiveness 
to private investors and the access to low-cost credit are beyond the scope of this paper. One option 
worth mentioning though is that it might be optimal for participants to collectively provide more than 
100% of the required credit support. As an example, members could each provide a guarantee for 
105% of their respective share of the Fund’s liabilities. Beyond its credit strength, the Fund will also 
have to optimize the structure of its bonds to target various investor groups. Offering the benefit of a 
green, sustainable and socially responsible investment could be an additional attraction on top of the 
returns paid to investors. Finally, the operations of the Fund could be carried by a new organization or 
in partnership with an existing international organization such as the World Bank.  
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The long-term financial strength of the Fund under various scenarios will be another important 
consideration for private investors. Checks and covenants could be put in place in order to ensure that 
the finances of the Fund are sustainable irrespective of future developments. One example would be 
establishing a cap on total annual payments. If the sum of individual annual entitlements from the 
Fund exceeds this cap, all payments could be scaled back on a pro rata basis to comply with the annual 
cap. This could be achieved either by reducing the carbon price or by lowering the individual 
benchmarks on a pro-rata basis. Lowering the benchmarks is probably preferable to lowering the 
carbon price as the latter would reduce the marginal benefit of additional emission cuts for 
participants. A second mitigant to an unsustainable build up of debt by the Fund could be capping the 
Fund’s liabilities to those relating to a certain period on a rolling basis. As an example, if this period 
would be set as 20 years, all liabilities that relate to the period preceding the past 20 years would 
always need to be repaid through contributions from participants as opposed to through new debt 
issuance. Such covenants would also mitigate the risks related to prediction errors, i.e. if the actual 
emissions and finances of the Fund turn out to be considerably different to expectations at the time of 
its establishment. 
 
Importantly, neither of these covenants would significantly change the motivation of countries to join 
and to curb emissions. Based on experience, 20 years is more than long enough for decision-makers to 
heavily discount future obligations with the prospect of short-term gains. Similarly, even if an annual 
cap on Fund payments reduces the payment received by an individual country, any marginal reduction 
it can achieve will still secure it a larger share of the overall payments and hence larger receipts at the 
expense of other participants. It is worth noting that such a scenario bears similarity to the tragedy of 
the commons, but in this case the common resource that is overused is the Fund’s annual payment 
pool. The incentive of countries is to cut emissions beyond the level that would maximize their 
collective short-term benefits defined as the sum of Fund payments less the cost of emission 
reduction.  
 
The allocation of future liabilities among participating countries will be another important element of 
the agreement and the Fund’s operations. This paper proposes allocating liabilities based on 
participants’ benchmark emission level over time, which probably serves as a good proxy for a fair and 
effective allocation reflecting the size of countries, their contribution to climate change (at least on a 
forward looking basis) and their potential to benefit from the Fund’s payments, which should be 
roughly proportional to their benchmark. This allocation could be further refined, for instance by 
applying different weights to benchmarks of different years or linking the allocation of liabilities to 
future variables and hence making it dynamic. Of course, a completely different allocation mechanism 
could also be considered. 
 
Note that the Fund’s liabilities and hence the required financial backing by participants remains 
contingent on countries reducing emissions to below their benchmark and the extent of future costs 
depends on the sum of these emission savings. In case future liabilities of countries could be 
structured in a way that keeps them off balance sheet for governments under the applicable 
accounting rules, this would provide an additional incentive for governments to join the agreement. 
Exploring this possibility is beyond the scope of the paper.  
 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the financing sources and uses of the Fund and countries through a 
two-country example based on the following assumptions.  
1. The agreement comes into effect and the Fund starts operations in 2017.  
2. The price of carbon is set at USD 50 per ton of CO2e in 2017 prices and is indexed at 2% p.a.  
3. Total emission benchmarks assumed in 2030 are based on INDCs. Actual future emissions levels 
are assumed to be consistent with keeping global warming below 2 °C. This implies an emission 
reduction of 14 GtCO2e below the sum of unconditional INDCs by 2030 – 42 GtCO2e  of actual 
emission compared with 56 GtCO2e (UNEP 2015). The example assumes that this reduction is 
reached in a linear fashion between 2016 and 2030.  
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4. Beyond 2030, this linear trend of increasing emission savings compared to benchmarks continues 
and that global emissions will be 34 GtCO2e below the benchmark levels by 2050. The 2050 
emission level consistent with the 2 °C warming path with >66% probability is 23 GtCO2e (UNEP 
2015). Accordingly, this emission savings assumption implies that the benchmark levels remain 
effectively flat until 2050 – increasing slightly from 56 to 57 GtCO2e p.a. from 2030 to 2050. Note 
that the carbon price and the emission reductions are independent in this example. Clearly, they 
are strongly linked in reality and this relationship would need to be considered when determining 
the carbon price and the financeability of the Fund.  
5. Global nominal GDP is USD 80 trillion in 2016, which is conservative based on the 2014 estimate of 
USD 77.96 trillion (World Bank 2016), and that it will grow by 5% in nominal terms in the future. 
6. Interest expense is assumed to be 2.5% p.a. Compared to current market conditions this implies a 
rise in interest rates. 
7. The Fund is assumed to have an annual payment cap of USD 1,000 billion in 2017 indexed at 2% 
p.a. similar to the carbon price.  
8. In order to limit an unsustainable build-up of the Fund’s debt, liabilities (including related interest 
costs) incurred more than 20 years earlier are assumed to be repaid through contributions by 
participants as opposed to new debt issuance by the Fund.  
9. Country A has twice the initial emission benchmark level of Country B and the two countries are 
responsible for all global emissions. 
10. Country A’s benchmark declines by 0.5 GtCO2e p.a. until 2030, by 0.25 GtCO2e between 2031-2040 
and then is kept flat. Country B’s benchmark is increased over time to mirror the reduction of 
Country A’s benchmark so that the overall benchmark emissions remain unchanged. Note that in 
order to keep the calculations easier to follow, the two-country example keeps emission 
benchmarks flat at 54 GtCO2e p.a. and shows actual emissions at 20 GtCO2e in 2050. Gradually 
increasing benchmarks to 57 GtCO2e p.a. and reducing actual emissions to only 23 GtCO2e by 2050 
would not change the financing flows and conclusions.  
11. The example assumes that the actual emissions of both countries decline by the same amount in 
absolute terms (0.5 GtCO2e p.a.) relative to their benchmark emission path. Given the lower initial 
emissions of Country B, this assumption implies a larger cut by Country B relative to its emissions.  
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Figure 3. Illustrative example of the financing of the Climate Opportuntiy Fund 
Year Year
Emission 
reduction v 
bechmarks 
(GtCO2e)
Carbon 
price 
(USD/tCO2e)
Annual 
financing 
need      
(USD bn)
Annual cap 
(USD bn)
Financing 
from 
members 
(USD bn)
Cumulative 
debt incl 
interest 
(USD bn)
Global 
nominal 
GDP     
(USD bn)
Cumulative 
liability as 
% of global 
GDP
1 2017 1 50.0 50 1,000 0 50 84,000 0.1%
2 2018 2 51.0 102 1,020 0 153 88,200 0.2%
3 2019 3 52.0 156 1,040 0 313 92,610 0.3%
4 2020 4 53.1 212 1,061 0 533 97,241 0.5%
5 2021 5 54.1 271 1,082 0 817 102,103 0.8%
6 2022 6 55.2 331 1,104 0 1,169 107,208 1.1%
7 2023 7 56.3 394 1,126 0 1,592 112,568 1.4%
8 2024 8 57.4 459 1,149 0 2,091 118,196 1.8%
9 2025 9 58.6 527 1,172 0 2,671 124,106 2.2%
10 2026 10 59.8 598 1,195 0 3,335 130,312 2.6%
11 2027 11 60.9 670 1,219 0 4,089 136,827 3.0%
12 2028 12 62.2 746 1,243 0 4,937 143,669 3.4%
13 2029 13 63.4 824 1,268 0 5,885 150,852 3.9%
14 2030 14 64.7 906 1,294 0 6,938 158,395 4.4%
15 2031 15 66.0 990 1,319 0 8,101 166,314 4.9%
16 2032 16 67.3 1,077 1,346 0 9,380 174,630 5.4%
17 2033 17 68.6 1,167 1,373 0 10,781 183,361 5.9%
18 2034 18 70.0 1,260 1,400 0 12,311 192,530 6.4%
19 2035 19 71.4 1,357 1,428 0 13,976 202,156 6.9%
20 2036 20 72.8 1,457 1,457 0 15,782 212,264 7.4%
21 2037 21 74.3 1,486 1,486 82 17,581 222,877 7.9%
22 2038 22 75.8 1,516 1,516 167 19,369 234,021 8.3%
23 2039 23 77.3 1,546 1,546 256 21,143 245,722 8.6%
24 2040 24 78.8 1,577 1,577 348 22,901 258,008 8.9%
25 2041 25 80.4 1,608 1,608 443 24,638 270,908 9.1%
26 2042 26 82.0 1,641 1,641 543 26,352 284,454 9.3%
27 2043 27 83.7 1,673 1,673 646 28,039 298,677 9.4%
28 2044 28 85.3 1,707 1,707 753 29,693 313,610 9.5%
29 2045 29 87.1 1,741 1,741 864 31,313 329,291 9.5%
30 2046 30 88.8 1,776 1,776 979 32,892 345,755 9.5%
31 2047 31 90.6 1,811 1,811 1,099 34,427 363,043 9.5%
32 2048 32 92.4 1,848 1,848 1,222 35,913 381,195 9.4%
33 2049 33 94.2 1,885 1,885 1,351 37,345 400,255 9.3%
34 2050 34 96.1 1,922 1,922 1,484 38,717 420,268 9.2%  
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The example highlights that even in a scenario, where emission benchmarks are kept flat or rise 
slightly until 2050 (i.e. current INDC targets for 2030 are not revised 2050 targets are set at the same 
level too) and where actual emissions are cut to levels that are consistent with a 2 °C warming path 
based on a carbon price that rises from USD 50 to nearly USD 100 per ton of CO2e between 2017 and 
2050, the Fund’s total financing needs peak at a level below 10% of global GDP. This, of course, is a 
significant level of debt and in order to motivate countries to join and act, it has to be meaningful as 
they will be the beneficiaries of the annual payments. Of course, to the extent more ambitious 
benchmarks can be agreed, the financing requirements could be reduced. However, even this level 
could be financed by private investors, especially if we consider the gradual rise in the Fund’s debt over 
30 years. To put these financing requirements into perspective, global non-financial debt increased by 
USD 50 trillion during the six and half years between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the second 
quarter of 2014 (MGI 2015). This represents an approximately 25 percentage point increase as a 
proportion of global GDP.  
 
The example also shows the potential impact on individual countries. While identical in absolute terms, 
Figure 4. Illustrative two-country example of the benefits and financial costs
Year Year
Country A 
benchmark 
emission 
(GtCO2e)
Country B 
benchmark 
emission 
(GtCO2e)
Country A 
actual 
emission 
(GtCO2e)
Country B 
actual 
emission 
(GtCO2e)
Country A 
payment 
received 
(USD bn)
Country B 
payment 
received 
(USD bn)
Country A 
contribution 
to Fund 
(USD bn)
Country A 
contribution 
to Fund 
(USD bn)
1 2017 36.00 18.00 35.50 17.50 25 25 0 0
2 2018 35.50 18.50 34.50 17.50 51 51 0 0
3 2019 35.00 19.00 33.50 17.50 78 78 0 0
4 2020 34.50 19.50 32.50 17.50 106 106 0 0
5 2021 34.00 20.00 31.50 17.50 135 135 0 0
6 2022 33.50 20.50 30.50 17.50 166 166 0 0
7 2023 33.00 21.00 29.50 17.50 197 197 0 0
8 2024 32.50 21.50 28.50 17.50 230 230 0 0
9 2025 32.00 22.00 27.50 17.50 264 264 0 0
10 2026 31.50 22.50 26.50 17.50 299 299 0 0
11 2027 31.00 23.00 25.50 17.50 335 335 0 0
12 2028 30.50 23.50 24.50 17.50 373 373 0 0
13 2029 30.00 24.00 23.50 17.50 412 412 0 0
14 2030 29.50 24.50 22.50 17.50 453 453 0 0
15 2031 29.25 24.75 21.75 17.25 495 495 0 0
16 2032 29.00 25.00 21.00 17.00 538 538 0 0
17 2033 28.75 25.25 20.25 16.75 583 583 0 0
18 2034 28.50 25.50 19.50 16.50 630 630 0 0
19 2035 28.25 25.75 18.75 16.25 678 678 0 0
20 2036 28.00 26.00 18.00 16.00 728 728 0 0
21 2037 27.75 26.25 17.25 15.75 743 743 45 37
22 2038 27.50 26.50 16.50 15.50 758 758 92 75
23 2039 27.25 26.75 15.75 15.25 773 773 141 115
24 2040 27.00 27.00 15.00 15.00 788 788 191 157
25 2041 27.00 27.00 14.50 14.50 804 804 244 200
26 2042 27.00 27.00 14.00 14.00 820 820 298 244
27 2043 27.00 27.00 13.50 13.50 837 837 355 291
28 2044 27.00 27.00 13.00 13.00 853 853 414 339
29 2045 27.00 27.00 12.50 12.50 871 871 475 389
30 2046 27.00 27.00 12.00 12.00 888 888 539 441
31 2047 27.00 27.00 11.50 11.50 906 906 604 494
32 2048 27.00 27.00 11.00 11.00 924 924 672 550
33 2049 27.00 27.00 10.50 10.50 942 942 743 608
34 2050 27.00 27.00 10.00 10.00 961 961 816 668
1,009.75 826.25
55.0% 45.0%Allocation of 
liabilities
Total
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County B’s benefit from the Fund relative to its size as measured by emission levels is larger than 
Country A’s benefit. Country B also receives half of the payments by the Fund, but its future 
contributions to the Fund would be only 45% of the total.  
 
Finally, while this section focused on the costs of the proposed plan, it is important to keep in mind the 
difference between the financial and economic cost. The costs discussed above and shown in the 
example are financial costs, i.e. the payments that are made to participants to incentivize them to cut 
emissions as well as the related financing costs. The economic cost of climate change mitigation is the 
opportunity cost of the real resources used for the mitigation efforts, as they are not available to 
produce other goods and services. This distinction highlights the fact that, in contrast to financial costs, 
the economic costs are highly dependent on the state of the economy and the utilization of resources. 
In an environment where resources are idle or underutilized, which is what many economists consider 
the current situation to be – often describing it in terms of a structural shortfall of aggregate demand 
compared to the potential economic output, depressed real interest rates due to the imbalance 
between intended savings and investment, secular stagnation etc – the economic cost of climate 
change mitigation will be smaller than suggested by the financial costs. The fiscal multiplier, being also 
dependent on the utilization of resources, is a proxy indicator of the growth impact of additional 
spending or investment. There is evidence that fiscal multipliers are larger when monetary policy is 
constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, the financial sector or the economy is 
weak, which are conditions that have characterized the post-crisis period (IMF 2013). Investing in 
climate change mitigation under these conditions might have a smaller economic cost (or even an 
economic benefit) with significant implications for the trade-off between climate change mitigation and 
economic welfare or growth.  The financial costs would still be incurred, however their impact on 
welfare or on measures such as total debt as a percentage of global GDP could be partially or wholly 
offset by its positive impact on economic growth.  
 
6. Other benefits and consideration  
 
The main advantages of the proposed design are that it makes reaching an effective international 
agreement more realistic than the current negotiating approach, it incentivizes countries to join, it 
incentivizes them to cut emissions and it provides additional financing from private investors. There 
are some other advantages and disadvantages discussed in this section.  
 
The international agreement outlined allows complete flexibility in terms of the policy mix used by 
individual countries and focuses only on the net emission reduction achieved. This will be politically 
attractive. Countries could use carbon taxes, they could use a cap-and-trade system with allocation of 
emission rights either free or for a charge, they could use subsidies, administrative and regulatory 
measures and/or investments in new technologies. In addition to its political attractiveness, this 
flexibility will facilitate policy innovation and competition across countries to reduce emissions through 
optimal economic, institutional and technological solutions.  
 
Further, the agreement does not require any enforcement, it does not rely on compliance with any 
policy or implementation guidelines, and it does not require additional monitoring or reporting beyond 
those of net emissions. This, again, should be an attractive feature from a political perspective.  It 
sidesteps the challenges of enforcement in the case of sovereign states (Nordhaus 2015) . Countries 
that cut emissions below their benchmark level receive payments from the Fund, those that do not, 
simply do not receive any payments.  
 
One disadvantage of the proposal is that it requires a change in the status quo and the approach 
pursued to date. This, clearly, is a considerable challenge and it would take some time for the 
international community to change course. On the other hand, the failure of the efforts over the past 
two and half decades to find an effective agreement justifies a search for alternatives and tackling the 
status quo. Following the Paris Agreement of last December, there is a risk that very little progress will 
be made over the next five years in the hope that countries adjust to be in line with their non-binding 
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targets and that targets will be significantly revised in 2020. This is a highly risky course of action.  
 
Another problem with a design relying on voluntary participation and rewards instead of penalties is 
that some countries might decide not to join. As the financial costs of the Fund would need to be paid 
by members in the future, countries that opt-out could avoid these future costs and could still free-ride 
on the efforts of other countries over the long-term. As discussed above, this is mitigated partly by 
these countries also losing out on the short-term benefits. Public and international pressure could also 
be applied to ensure participation by countries. Finally, trade sanctions could be used against such 
countries with the justification to avoid exporting greenhouse gas emissions to them and to level the 
competitive playing field. Such trade sanctions can be effective (Nordhaus 2015) and can conform to 
WTO rules (Stiglitz 2006). Countries that join and fail to cut emissions would not need to be subject to 
the same trade restriction as by joining the agreement they would be contributing to the future 
financial costs.  
 
Even though the proposed framework makes reaching an effective international agreement more 
realistic, the process of adjustment to a less carbon intensive economy and society will remain 
challenging and will require significant efforts. Nevertheless, an international agreement, strong 
incentives to curb emissions and the additional financing created by the Fund would make the 
implementation easier and more achievable.  
 
As discussed earlier, the proposal involves a financial cost that needs to be repaid by participants in 
the future i.e. future generations. The proposal reflects the view that leaving a financial burden to 
future generations is preferable to leaving them an environmental burden especially if we act sooner 
rather than later and the financial burden can be minimized as much as possible. This solution also 
postpones the costs to more closely match the time benefits are realized, which by their nature will 
crystalize over the long-term. We now have decades of evidence that leaving future generations 
neither an environmental nor a financial burden – i.e. covering the financial cost of mitigation 
ourselves – is currently not a realistic option.  
 
Clearly, many areas of the proposal need to be worked out and agreed in a lot of detail. Amongst 
others these include the legal framework, the institutional setup, the formula for allocating future 
liabilities across countries and over time, determining the right level of carbon price, and optimizing 
the attractiveness for private investors. Ensuring public and political support for such an approach will 
be critical. All these areas require further research, debate and action.   
 
7. Conclusions  
 
The paper proposes an alternative design for international cooperation to mitigate climate change. The 
idea is to resolve the dual conflict between the nature of climate change and our political and social 
reality. Key elements of the framework include establishing a new international treaty and fund; 
determining a benchmark emission path for each country as well as a carbon price; paying countries 
annually through the fund for reducing emissions below their benchmark levels; financing the fund’s 
annual payments by raising capital from private investors; and repaying the private capital in the long-
term using contributions from participating countries. 
 
There are a number of very important advantages of such a design. First, reaching an agreement that 
effectively mitigates climate change becomes easier and more realistic as the scheme’s features are 
politically more palatable and offer short-term benefits to participants. Climate change negotiations 
are transformed from finding an agreement on sharing costly and burdensome actions among 
countries in a zero-sum game into creating a short-term opportunity for participants to profit from 
immediate payments.   
 
Second, the self-interest of countries is turned into a driver for abatement. The individual cost and 
shared benefit that characterizes current mitigation efforts is turned upside-down and becomes the 
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combination of individual benefit and shared costs under this framework. By reducing emissions a 
country benefits in the form of getting paid by the Climate Opportunity Fund, while it is only 
responsible for a fraction of the future liability this creates.  This shift could also be described using the 
concept of the tragedy of the commons. Today the common resource is the atmosphere and the free 
riders are the laggards, who expect to benefit from the mitigation effort of others. Under the proposed 
agreement the common resource is the Climate Opportunity Fund and the free riders are those saving 
most emissions and collecting most of the payments from the Fund.  
 
Third, short-termism also becomes a driver for emission reduction. Countries and governments, 
politicians, businesses and individuals behind them get a short-term benefit in the form of immediate 
cash receipts in exchange for a long-term liability by joining the climate fund and cutting emissions. 
The payments received can be used in any way to deal with today’s priorities, be it job creation, 
investment, energy independence, tax cuts, carbon emission reduction etc. History teaches us that 
politicians and people respond strongly to such incentives.  
 
Fourth, additional financing is created which is raised from the private sector. Apart from their 
motivational impact, these funds can also help finance the necessary investment and adjustment.  
 
Fifth, participating countries retain full flexibility and control over the policies they use.  Apart from its 
political attractiveness, this creates room for policy innovation and competition in search of the most 
efficient solutions.  
Finally, the challenges associated with the enforcement of international agreements are significantly 
reduced under this approach.  
 
We have the means to tackle climate change. The current international approach, however, relies on 
the hope that this time the shared responsibility of countries and the long-term benefits will overcome 
their conflicting self-interests and short-termism.  Based on the history of climate negotiations, this is a 
highly risky approach and we should find better alternatives.  
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